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he responsibility to protect (R2P or RtoP) is a relatively new normative construction of 
the United Nations, which was launched in 2005 at the World Summit, in the 
aftermath of the terrible Central African genocides and other atrocities of the recent 
past. The summit’s concluding document declared that it is the responsibility of 
governments to protect their own citizens, and in particular from “genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”. When they fail, the international community 
shall have the responsibility to “take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, 
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a 
case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, 
should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”. 
Yet at the global level there is a huge chasm of disagreement over the competition for 
primacy of norms, broadly between the West and the ‘Rest’ of the world. The West sees R2P 
as an important advance in international norms, complementing the existing Chapter 7 of the 
UN Charter, which was designed to provide for the possibility of armed intervention in the 
case of inter-state aggression. R2P adds a new principle, which may authorise forceful 
intervention in the internal affairs of states. The ‘Rest’, led by Russia and China, give primacy 
to the principle of non-interference. The West also endorses the principle of non-interference 
as a general proposition. The issue, however, is when should R2P override the non-
interference doctrine. 
Libya 2011 has now become the most famous instance of R2P being operationalised through 
Resolution 1973 of 17 March 2011, which legitimised the intervention by France, the UK, the 
US and other NATO allies to enforce a no-fly zone and to take any steps (short of putting 
boots on the ground) to support rebel forces in their civil war against Khadafi. The passing of 
Resolution 1973 of the Security Council was greatly helped by the resolutions adopted by the 
African Union and Arab League, without which Russia and China would surely not have 
abstained from using their veto cards as permanent members of the Security Council.  
As the intervention in Libya progressed, China and especially Russia voiced regrets over 
having abstained, claiming that the NATO forces had overstepped their mandate for 
enforcing a no-fly zone, escalating their action into one of enforcing regime change. Indeed 
that had become the objective, but how could the R2P principle be enforced without this? It 
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was obvious enough that Khadafi was prepared to continue to slaughter his people in a civil 
war to retain power. Nonetheless Russia and China complained rather disingenuously that 
they had been duped by the West, claiming that the NATO allies were converting R2P into a 
instrument of regime change.  
And then the spotlight switched to Syria, and immediately Russia declared that it would 
block any R2P resolution, because the West could not be trusted to stick to a limited 
mandate. In any case, the West had no stomach for a Libya-type intervention. While the 
issues of political morality were not really different between Libya and Syria, there were 
major differences in other respects: Syria would be a far more difficult proposition militarily 
and the complexity of security in the region was such that the law of unintended 
consequences would have ominous potential. Turkey could open its frontier to refugees and 
the West could implement economic and political sanctions. But the effort would stop there. 
But then the murderous repression by the Syrian authorities went on and on as the months 
passed by, and quite remarkably the Arab League acted again, with Turkey participating in 
its meetings as if it were an honorary member of the organisation. On 23 November, the 
League delivered a three-day ultimatum to Syria to stop its murderous repression. Having 
received no satisfaction, it decided on 27 November to sanction Syria by cutting off all 
transactions with the central bank of Syria and its commercial banks, applying an asset 
freeze on senior officials, suspending funding for various projects, etc. The message was also 
delivered that Bashar Assad had to go: regime change, please.  
At the same time, the leaders of the Arab League found further justification for their action in 
the findings of a panel of the UN Human Rights Commission, which reported on their 
mission to Syria with evidence of crimes against humanity and the deaths of more than 3,500 
people. “The sheer scale and consistent pattern of attacks by military and security forces on 
civilians and civilian neighbourhoods and the widespread destruction of property could 
only be possible with the approval or complicity of the state.” 
Meanwhile, Russia has added an element of confusion by sending a flotilla of warships to 
the Mediterranean, led by the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, heading for its naval base 
at Tartus on the Syrian coast. And what is the brave Admiral Kuznetsov to do there? To 
protect Bashar Assad? Surely not. To join with the West in protecting the Syrian citizens 
against him? Surely not. According to a naval spokesman, “the call of Russian ships in Tartus 
should not be seen as a gesture towards what is going on in Syria. This was already planned 
in 2010”. Or perhaps it has moored there just enjoy a warm water cruise over the winter? 
Surely not. 
What has been going on in Syria has become unbearable for its Arab neighbours to stand by 
and watch (excepting Lebanon and Iraq who abstained, but did not block the Arab League 
action). It bears some similarities with how the EU viewed the humanitarian atrocities that 
came with the break-up of Yugoslavia. Military intervention is still not expected in Syria, 
although France’s foreign minister has now floated the idea of a ‘humanitarian corridor’ into 
Syria, without saying whether this should be militarily protected. But the key point is that 
the Arab League and the West have moved closer together. Both are interested in advancing 
democratic freedoms, albeit some faster than others, both are prepared to act across state 
borders to protect the people in their close neighbourhood, both are prepared to advocate 
regime change explicitly in extreme cases (Libya, Syria, Yemen). This marks a certain 
recovery of the R2P doctrine after the critique of the Libyan campaign by Russia and China. 
It not so clearly now the West versus the Rest.  